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Abstract 
This paper presents a proposal for human-centred identity management. Even though the 
term ‘human-centred identity’ has been widely used in the past few years, the solutions 
either  descritbe  a  technical  system  for  managing  identity,  or  describe  an  identity 
management solution that meets a particular administrative need. Our proposal, however, 
presents a set of propertis that have to be considered, and the choices have to be made for 
each property must satisfy the needs of both the individual and the organization that owns 
the identity management system. The properties were identified as a result of reviewing a 
range  of  national  identity  systems,  and  the  problems  that  arise  from  them.1 Introduction: Identity Systems Today 
Identity  is  a  construct  that  underlies  the  mechanisms  which  enable  or  prevent  an 
individual from performing certain actions in a social environment. Either explicitly or 
implicitly, organizations have always sought to close „the gap of uncertainty‟ between an 
individual‟s claimed identity, and their „true‟ identity one. This is in no small part due to 
the increasing disembodiment of transactional processes – interactions that previously 
used to be conducted face-to-face, and using physical documents as evidence, are now 
mediated through information and communication technology [1, 2]. There has been a 
flurry of research activity in the area of identity and identity management, and many 
large-scale systems have been proposed, designed and implemented. 
In the private sector, the increase of identity and information collection is driven by the 
wish  to  personalize  services.  For  recommender  and  social  networking  systems,  the 
aggregation of various types of information about individuals is essential. The public 
sector is using similar approaches to realize the ambition of the vision for “citizen-centric 
services”, as well as datasharing to reduce costs and detect fraud. In the UK, security 
challenges (terrorism, crime, fraud, etc.) have led to increased monitoring of citizens and 
their activities, to the point of what critics describe as a Surveillance Society [3].  
Individuals have accepted some of those developments, but voice their disagreement in 
other cases: e.g. Facebook users when profile updates were broadcast [4], or the public 
concerns about the introduction of national identity systems [5-7]. In some cases, there 
has been simple lack of adoption of certain technologies, e.g. the case of the Austrian eID 
[8]. The problem is that the systems have been based on what is technically feasible, and 
ignoring human needs and concerns [9]. This result in a lack of understanding as to how 
people actually view, assess and interact with identity systems. In this paper, we aim to 
identify how the needs and concerns can be addressed during the design stage. 
1. 1 Identity and Privacy
The use of identity is a dialectic process: it involves the transfer of information from one 
party  to  another  in  order  to  progress  through  the  various  steps  of  identification, 
authentication  and  authorization.  This  immediately  raises  issues  of  control  over,  and 
safety of the identity information. Who should have access to what, when and why? 
These are the main issues that privacy research seeks to understand and solve. 
Privacy  studies  wrestle  with  a  multidimensional  concept  [10-12].  There  is  no  single 
agreed definition of privacy. In the area of identity management systems, the focus is on 
informational  privacy  constraint  [13]  as  identity  is  typically  defined  as  a  set  of 
information/attributes, about an individual that sufficiently differentiates the individual 
from a set of other individuals.   
 
Previous research on informational privacy dimensions has helped to build a legal body 
of rules to protect the subjects of such schemes; the cornerstone of which are the Data 
Protection Act and the Fair Information Usage principles. The rise in the level of privacy 
concerns  have  also  resulted  in  the  development  of  Privacy  Enhancing  Technologies 
(PETs), which aim to protect an individual‟s privacy in digital interactions by limiting or 
encrypting identifying information. However, while these solutions can and do help to 
address the concerns brought about by identity systems, they are not without problems.  
One of the drawbacks with the privacy approach is that individuals make their decisions 
based on the perceived rather than actual level of privacy provided. Additionally, it has 
been shown that the line drawn between public and private is  dynamic  – it changes 
depending on the information and context of use. Individuals have claimed that certain 
information is off-limits, but disclose it when a trivial benefit is offered [14,15,13].  
The various legal definitions of privacy are constructed at a higher level of abstraction 
than identity management systems. Attempts to apply legal constraints to system design 
usually reduces privacy assessment to a set of checklists (e.g. Privacy Impact Assessment 
checklists), rather than understanding the impact of the system on the individual. Privacy-
enchancing technologies (PETs) are well-intentioned, but are  yet again a technology-
centered paradigm that means that the system designers and owners can use to absolve 
their  responsibility  with  understanding  what  the  impact  on  the  lived  experience  of 
individuals will be. 
1.2 Identity and Trust 
Trust is required in situations of risk uncertainty. In an identity scheme, trust helps an 
individual to make decisions about disclosing information that might result in undesired 
usage (e.g. information abuse, identity theft). There has been much work in developing 
models of trust that aim to predict user decisions to take action in uncertain situations. 
In attempting to create a trust model for national identity systems,  [16] explored the 
intention to adopt such systems as the development of trust through several stages of the 
subject‟s interpretation of the situation. Another effort in the area comes from [17] in 
measuring  the  level  of  citizen  trust  towards  authorities  in  the  implementation  of  a 
European Union wide identity scheme.  
While these approaches are useful in understanding which general areas can be improved 
to generate trust, it fails to account for the structure of an identity system itself. This 
approach provides very little linkage back to the actual identity system, and hence offers 
implementers  little  guidance  on  how  the  actual  design  of  a  system  might  influence 
behavior or perceptions. 2. Human-centred Identity – what is it?
Neither  privacy  or  trust  research  can  provide  an  answer  to  this  question.  Analyzing 
schemes  from  a  privacy  or  trust  perspective  abstracts  the  identity  system  from  the 
specific consequences that is has on individuals lives, how they interact with the system 
and the various „coping‟ strategies that might be adopted.  
Practitioners and researchers require a way of predicting the lived experience that results 
from participating in an identity ecosystem. Thus, they need tool or method that allows a 
system  owner  or  developer  to  assess  how  the  design  of  the  identity  systems  might 
influence user interaction, perception and reaction. 
2.1 Methodology 
A tool aiming to assess the impact of an identity system design should be expressed as a 
set of „configuration‟ properties into which any such system can be decomposed. We 
identified these properties through a review of past National Identity Systems. The scope 
of work is limited to National Identity Systems in the Western world, since information is 
readily available, and these countries have been leading the adoption electronic identity 
systems [18]. Each system was treated as a unique case study.  
Thematic Coding [19, 20] was used to identify similarities across the narratives of past 
and  present  national-scale  identity  schemes.  The  analysis  revealed  that  a  system 
configuration  can  be  broken  down  into  two  different  attribute  sets,  i.e.  the  structural 
properties and the metrical properties. The individual properties from these respective 
sets „measure‟ the amount of relevant affordances that the system can provide for each 
property. 
2.2 Structural properties 
The structure of an identity system refers to the manner in which an identity ecosystem 
can be constructed.  These properties seek to capture the flow of information inside the 
web of identity that is established. Therefore, the structure of an identity scheme will 
define how the interaction between individual and society  is shaped by the identification 
system.  We  now  present  and  explain  the  structural  properties  that  emerged  from  the 
analysis. 
2.2.1 Control Points 
One of the main structural properties of any identity system can be expressed in terms of 
the number of control points that is  built into the overall scheme. Control points are 
defined as the situations in which an individual’s identity is required in order to proceed 
with  a  particular  function.  When  an  identity  ecosystem  contains  a  large  number  of 
control points - where an individual‟s identity is required to move from one state to 
another - the identity is exposed frequently to the relying party. Inversely, a low level of 
control points implies that an individual‟s identity is not requested frequently.   
 
2.2.2 Subject Involvement 
This  property  captures  the  role  played  by  the  individual  whenever  his/her  respective 
identity is consumed by another party across all possible control points – whether it is 
active or passive. A system with a high level of involvement gives individuals an active 
role in the presentation of their identity, i.e. an individual will need to be present when 
their identity is used. On the other end of the spectrum, individuals can be completely 
passive members of an identity scheme. Systems that make use of a centralized database 
to store information are prime candidates for low involvement.  The records stored on the 
database can be accessed by the organization without the individual being present, and 
unaware that the identity is being accessed.  
2.2.3 Discreetness 
An individual enrolls into an identity system to gain access to certain resources - this 
involves the presentation and use of subject identities at various control points. This has 
the implication that an individual‟s identity, and the information attached to it, will be 
exposed to a consuming party. This process harbours the risk of identity “leakage” to 
non-consuming  or  non-reliant  parties.  Unnecessary  disclosure  of  information  at  the 
various control points can be expressed as the level of discreetness of the identity system; 
as such, it refers to the level of control that individuals have in presenting the identity to 
the rest of society. A system with a low level of discreetness constantly “leaks” identity 
information to third parties that have no right or no permission to the identity. Identity 
systems that preserve the integrity of the identity from other parties offer high levels of 
discretion.  
2.2.4 Population Participation 
Finally, the level of population participation represents another structural property of an 
identification system. This property refers to the number of individuals that are enrolled 
and interact with the system, in relation to the size of the total population that participates 
and acts in the context of which the identity system operates. A system with a low level 
of population participation would be one that is highly targeted, where the number of 
subjects  that  are  enrolled  into  the  system  consists  of  a  small  fraction  of  the  entire 
population in that context. On the other hand, a system that by default has everyone in the 
population enroll has a high level of population participation. 
2.3 Metrical Properties 
The  metric  of  an  identity  system  refers  to  the  various  techniques,  methods  and 
technologies that are used to capture and present an individual‟s identity. The metrical 
properties defined here attempts to capture how individuals interact with, and are affected 
by, various affordances that the underlying identifying technologies of an identification 
system can offer. These attributes can serve to influence the behavior and perceptions of 
individuals that encounter identity systems.  
 
2.3. 1 Comprehension 
Firstly, there is the matter of individuals‟ comprehension towards the various metrical 
technologies and techniques used for identification. This property is expressed in terms of 
how well an individual‟s understanding of the identifying technologies is aligned with 
reality. A system that has low levels of comprehension is one where individuals do not 
understand how the metrics are used to identify them. If individuals have some idea of 
how the mechanism works, but they are not aware of the entire process, this still results in 
low levels of comprehension. Low levels of comprehension occur when individuals are 
unable  to  point  out,  explain  or  rectify  any  problems  that  might  occur  during  the 
identification process. On the other hand, systems with high levels of comprehension are 
those in which an individual has a good mental representations of the process in which 
the identity metrics are used. 
2.3.2 Expert Analysis 
Another metrical property - related to subject comprehension - is that of expert analysis. 
This  property  refers  to  the  amount  of  human  activity  engaged  in  making  use  of  the 
information  collected  for  identification  purposes.  Completely  manual  systems  would 
equate to a high level of expert analysis as it requires „experts‟ to handle the identifying 
metric at various stages throughout the lifecycle of the identity. As such, systems with 
high  level  of  expert  analysis  typically  result  in  highly  subjective  systems  where  the 
identity is dependent on the interpretation of information by human users. Automated 
systems serve to decrease the amount of expert analysis involved, providing systems with 
an objective approach to processing identity. 
2.3.4 Information Accuracy 
Information accuracy is a property of the metric that defines how reliable the system is in 
producing correct matches in the process of identification. Identity systems that offer 
high  reliability  in  providing  correct  matches  are  said  to  be  provide  high  level  of 
information accuracy. However, this accuracy must not be based solely on the theoretical 
possibilities  that  have  been  touted  for  any  particular  identification  metric.  Accurate 
“measurement”  of  information  accuracy  will  need  to  take  into  account  the 
implementation specific details that can affect the theoretical figures that have been put 
forth.  The  inconsistencies  and  practical  limitations  of  the  real  world  will  need  to  be 
reflected in the information accuracy property of the system.  2.3.5 Identity Stability 
The chosen metric for an identification system will also have an impact on the stability of 
the registered identity. Stability refers to the rate with which an individual‟s information 
stored in an identification system changes over time. A system has a low level of stability 
if the information associated with the identity has the potential to fluctuate greatly over 
short periods. Identity systems that make a large use of biographical information typically 
have low levels of stability as the information can potentially change at any given time 
(e.g.  address,  profession,  even  name).  Conversely,  purely  biometrical  systems  can 
provide identity solutions with high levels of stability (depending on the biometric; facial 
recognition  for  example  would  not  provide  high  levels  of  stability)  as  the  metric  is 
believed to remain constant over the lifetime of an individual.  
2.3.6 Subject Coupling 
Identification  systems  do  not  only  vary  in  terms  of  the  stability  of  the  information 
collected, but also in terms of the amount of information that is collected and used for a 
particular purpose. This property of the system is known as subject coupling, i.e. the level 
of representativeness between the captured identity and the relevant „partial identity‟ [21] 
of the subject in relation to the purpose and context.  
A  tight  coupling  suggests  that  the  captured  identity  metrics  faithfully  represents  a 
person‟s partial identity at the various control points that it is applied. On the other hand, 
a system that collects and reveals too much or too little information about an individual is 
said to have a low subject coupling, since the identity that is captured and presented does 
not accurately represent the „complete‟ individual in that situation. While this property 
may seem like an easy aspect to establish, ensuring that subject coupling is accurately 
assessed depends on more subtle nuances about the information around the identity and 
the context.  While a lack of information to represent an individual means that there is a low subject 
coupling, the inverse is not always true. As per the definition of this property, subject 
coupling occurs when the identity created does not represent the person in the context. 
This  includes  cases  of  under-representation  as  stated  earlier  but  also  that  of  over-
representation. When „too‟ much information is known about an individual the consumer 
of that identity might then judge the individual based on the information that is irrelevant.  
Low subject coupling due to a lack of 
information. 
The identity consumer cannot come to 










Low subject coupling due to the 
availability of too much information. 
The identity consumer runs the risk of 
passing judgement based on information 
unrelated to the context. 2.3.7 Information Polymorphism 
Depending on the chosen metric, an individual‟s identity may be more or less prone to 
being  used  for  purposes  that  deviate  from  the  original  intention  for  which  it  was 
collected. The likelyhood that the identity may be used for some completely different 
purpose stems from the various meanings that can be attributed to or extracted from the 
information  held  about  individuals.  This  is  captured  by  the  term  information 
polymorphism.  Systems  with  a  high  level  of  information  polymorphism  are  those  in 
which an individual‟s identity and information can be easily taken out of context of the 
original scheme, and applied to other systems that have completely unrelated purposes. 
Systems with a high level of information polymorphism lead to situations of function-
creep of the identity. Alternatively, a low level of information polymorphism means that 
an individual‟s identity is safe from being exploited for other functions. 
2.4 Combining Properties 
Looking at the various properties individually can help researchers and practioners to 
understanding how and why the individuals might react to the introduction or alteration 
of an identity system. A system with a high number of control points might be perceived 
as – well: too controlling – and thus meet with resistance. A system with a low level of 
discreetness will be perceived as a violation of privacy, because the identity may be 
broadcast to parties that have no right to such information. Systems that need to be up-to-
date but made use of a metric that has a low level of identity stability may be seen as a 
burden upon individuals, who continuously have to report when information changes. 
We have not yet developed a complete map of interactions between properties, but feel 
that  the  explanatory  power  lies  in  the  combination  of  the  properties  of  interest,  and 
observing the potential effects. For example, if one were to take a system with a low 
population participation, coupled with a high subject involvement and a high number of 
control points; this can lead to a scenario where a subject might be forced to abandon 
his/her „identity‟ and construct a new one (if possible).  
The identity system is a highly targeted one, indicating that certain criterion needs to be 
met for inclusion into the system. The majority of the population acting in that particular 
context is able to bypass the system; if individuals play an active role at a large number 
of control points, some individuals might come to the conclusion that the burden of the 
system is unbearable. As such, in cases where it is possible to do so (e.g. identification 
systems based on religion), it can be expected that a number of individuals might avoid 
the identity system altogether. A  final  example:  in  an  identification  system  with  low  subject  coupling,  low 
understanding,  low  information  accuracy  and  a  high  expert  involvement  can  lead  to 
scenarios where subjects lose all „power‟ leading to claims and actions made on incorrect 
interpretations of the identity. The low subject coupling means that the captured identity 
does not fully represent the individual in the context of the identification system. The 
high expert involvement and low information accuracy further degrade the quality of the 
identity and the process of identification. As a result, false accusations may be made 
against the individual, based on flawed conclusions drawn from the identity.  
However, the fact that there is very little understanding regarding the system by non-
experts, the possibility of successfully disproving any claims is reduced significantly. 
Therefore,  a  system  with  such  a  configuration  will  likely  result  in  situations  where 
subjects lose all ability to resist claims based on the identity. This results on incorrect 
actions taken against a subject that and can cause permanent harm.  
3 Applying Properties to Real-World Scenarios 
The  system  properties  above  were  developed  through  an  investigation  of  National 
Identity Systems. To illustrate the applicability of the properties to different contexts, the 
properties will be used to investigate identity and information systems that have been 
implemented in completely different environments. In the follwing, we apply them to  a 
social networking system, and a personalized advertising platform through the lens of the 
developed properties.  
3.1 Social Networking 
Online Social Network Sites (SNS) have experienced incredible growth over the past few 
years. It has become an increasingly popular medium for individuals to connect with each 
other and share a high degree of personal information. From our point of view, an SNS is 
nothing more than a huge and detailed Identity Management System. This makes such 
sites a prime candidate by which we can apply the codes that the research has uncovered. 
Specifically, we will be looking at the Facebook platform. 
With over 200 million subjects, Facebook is arguably the most popular social platform 
today. It has also been the centre of some controversies. Just recently Facebook has been 
accused  of  breach  Canada's  Privacy  Laws  [22].  More  relevant  to  our  considerations, 
Facebook  has  recently  made  changes  to  the  design  and  flow  of  the  website  and  has 
caused backlash among its subjects.  
 
In 2005, Facebook introduced new features that affected the way in which information 
was distributed to a subject‟s network on the site. Prior to these changes, information that 
was inserted or updated on a subjects profile was only visible when the subject's profile 
page. Facebook then added the Newsfeed feature, which essentially aggregated all these 
information changes and broadcast them to a user‟s friends. This turned a process from a 
'pull' operation to a 'push'. Users reacted against this: Resistance groups were established. 
The Facebook CEO eventually responded, stating that no privacy options were taken 
away, and that the information was visible only to the same people who has access as 
before. "Nothing you do is being broadcast; rather it is being shared with people who 
care about what you do" [4]. Nevertheless, Facebook took down the Newsfeed, and re-
released it with various privacy controls. 
In their study of the situation, [4] attributed the resistance to individuals‟ perception of 
“information  access”  and  “illusory  control”.  Individuals  viewed  the  Newsfeed  as 
increasing  the  ease  with  which  their  information  can  be  accessed  by  others,  and  the 
absence of controls reduced the perceived level of control that subjects had. While this 
point of view is certainly justified, the properties that have been uncovered here might be 
able to shed more light on the situation and better relate the changes in the system to the 
reactions. 
The  most  relevant  properties  for  these  scenarios  are  control  points  and  subject 
involvement. Pre-Newsfeed, information was only accessible when the individual‟s page 
was visited by another individual. One can technically view this as a single control point. 
Post-Newsfeed, the number of control points increased dramatically: every person that 
the  information  was  pushed  to  represents  a  control  point,  where  the  individual‟s 
information is consumed.  
In  addition,  the  Newsfeed  can  be  interpreted  as  a  reduction  in  the  level  of  subject 
involvement: In the „pull‟ model, visiting an individual‟s page was a requirement, the 
page is a representation of the individual on the platform. The individual has taken time 
to create a profile that represents him/her to others. Therefore, accessing the page can be 
seen  as  a  control  point  that  has  a  high  level  of  subject  involvement.  The  Newsfeed 
represents  a  loss  of  involvement,  as  the  information  is  taken  from  the  individual- 
controlled profile and to the user at control points that subjects are not aware of or have 
no control over. 
3.2 Targeted Advertising 
Targeted advertising has proved to be an extremely lucrative way to increase revenues. 
This form of advertising involves the tracking of an individual‟s identity across various 
services. It could be something as simple as contextual targeting (using keywords based 
on the content of the current page), or based on individuals‟ browsing history across one 
or more sites. These browsing histories and identification details are typically handled in 
a decentralized manner, making use of cookies stored on the  user‟s computer. These 
tracking methods have raised issues among privacy advocates. A recent study found that a significant number of the US population object to the tracking 
of behavior. Turow et al. [23] found that 86% of young adults reject targeted advertising 
that tracks behavior across different websites. Advertisers, however, say that individuals - 
especially  the  younger  generation  -  do  not  mind  having  their  habits  tracked.  Recent 
developments in targeted advertising have taken the tracking to new levels. 
In the UK, Phorm is a company that has developed a targeted advertising platform that is 
tied directly to a subject‟s Internet Service Provider (ISP). Every subscriber to the ISP's 
network is turned into a subject of the system. Every website that a subject visits is 
passed through the system. It is checked against a list of advertising categories. If a match 
is found, the category is marked in a cookie and stored on the user‟s computer. This 
cookie is then used to provide targeted advertisement on any websites that through the 
use of a widget. The European Union has recently proceeded with legal proceedings in 
light of the controversial use of Phorm [24]. The arguments are usually tackled from a 
high level law based view of privacy rights. Phorm's arguments claim that subjects don't 
understand the technology and how it works, and that it actually provides anonymity.  
Applying structural properties, the items of interest are subject involvement, discreetness, 
and the level of control points. With every website passing through the system, Phorm 
presents  user  with  a  high  number  of  control  points,  resulting  in  a  very  restrictive 
environment for the individual. This situation is exacerbated by low subject involvement 
at the control points: The user‟s information is taken in a covert manner, without the 
indiviual being involved in the process. Phorm also provides subjects with a low level of 
Discreetness:. the tracked information is stored on a cookie on the user‟s computer. In a 
multi-user  environment,  the  same  computer  will  be  used  by  various  individuals  that 
Phorm  will  not  be  able  to  differentiate  amongst.  When  serving  customized  ads,  the 
system is constantly at risk of revealing a subjects preference by presenting customized 
content to the "wrong" individuals. 
From a metrical standpoint, the properties of interest are subject coupling, data stability 
and  ease  of  use.  Phorm  is  a  platform  used  by  a  user‟s    ISP  to  deliver  targeted 
advertisements.  The relationship between the  user  and the  ISP is  that of a consumer 
paying fees to gain access to the network. This relationship calls for the sharing of certain 
general and financial information. This is the relevant partial identity of the individual in 
the subscriber role. By making use of Phorm, ISP's expand beyond this boundary by 
tracking an individual‟s habits in depth. This therefore results in low subject coupling in 
the  ISP-subscriber  relationship.  Additionally,  an  individual‟s  browsing  habits  are 
constantly  growing  and  producing  a  very  dynamic  data  set  that  results  in  low  data 
stability. In terms of ease of use, the system was opt-out, meaning individuals would have 
to make the effort to request removal from the system.  
4 Conclusions 
Whilst the use of identity management systems in modern technologies has increased 
rapidly, the understanding of what constitutes appropriate use of identity lags behind. The 
disembodiment of modern man from transactions has increased the perceived need to 
capture the identity of individuals, and developments of systems have largely been driven by what is technically feasible, and the administrative convenience of the organizations 
that commission  the systems.  Whilst  the rhetoric of human-centred identity has  been 
plentiful,  little  research  has  been  carried  out  to  understand  the  human  experience  of 
identity in technology-mediated interactions. This paper presents a first proposal for a set 
of properties to understand the need of individuals when it comes to identity systems, and 
what constitutes acceptable use. 
The  solution  proposed  here  does  not  aim  to  replace  traditional  usability  and  user 
acceptance methods: the system properties presented here are complementary.  They are 
specific to identity management systems, and hence help to further explain the potential 
reactions and strategies that subjects may adopt when confronted with a system. This 
should help organizations to assess the possible impacts of identity management, and  
choose properties that meet individuals‟ needs as well as their own. References: 
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